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COMMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-DENIAL OF ADMISSION 
TO THE BAR BASED ON UNWARRANTED INFERENCES OF BAD MORAL 
CHARACTER-Power over admission to the bar has long been vest-
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ed in the judiciary of each state. While the legislature may pre-
scribe certain standards, the state court alone is responsible for 
the determination of those qualified for the practice of law with-
in its jurisdiction. The application of these standards often de-
mands the exercise of meticulous judgment by the court in 
reaching its conclusion as to an applicant's fitness. vVhere, on 
the evidence or lack of evidence presented, the court finds that 
it cannot in good conscience grant its approval, the candidate 
is denied admission. To the extent that such a denial appears un-
justified, serious constitutional questions may be raised. Is the 
state's determination to be final, based on a freedom to select 
its own bar? Or should the United States Supreme Court review 
this determination in order to ascertain whether the applicant's 
exclusion was arbitrary in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution? Two recent cases decided by the 
Supreme Court, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New 
lvlexico,1 and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,2 have shown 
1353 U.S. 232 (1957). Schware petitioned the State Board of Bar Examiners for per• 
mission to take the 1954 state bar examination. His application revealed that he had 
used certain aliases while a dock worker between 1933 and 1937, and that he had twice 
been arrested on "suspicion of criminal syndicalism" and also for violation of the Neu. 
trality Act of 1940. Charges were dropped in every instance. Confidential information 
obtained by the board indicated that petitioner ·had .been a member of the Communist 
Party from 1932 to 1940. Schware freely admitted his membership in the party when 
questioned. The board reviewed the evidence, and, after a formal hearing, denied the 
application on grounds that petitioner did not have the requisite "good moral character" 
required by statute of those applying to take the state bar examination. See N.M. Stat. 
Ann. (1953) ·§18·1·8 and the appended Rules Governing Admission to the Bar. The New 
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's denial. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 
60 N.M. 304, 291 P. (2d) 607 (1955). Schware petitioned the United States Supreme Court 
for certiorari, claiming that the state court's action had deprived him of due process 
of law, under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice 
Black, concluded that there was no evidence which rationally justified a finding that 
petitioner was morally unqualified to take the examination. Thus, Schware had been 
denied due process. Justice Frankfurter, with Justices Clark and Harlan; concurred on 
the ground that the state court was unwarranted in concluding that petitioner's past 
communist affiliation made him "a -person of questionable character." 
2 353 U.S. 252 (1957). The California Committee of Bar Examiners refused to certify 
Konigsberg for admission to the state bar, on grounds that he had failed to prove (1) 
that he was of good moral character and (2) that he did not advocate overthrow of the 
Government of the United States or of California ·by unconstitutional means. See Cali• 
fornia Business and Professions Code (1937) §6060(c) and (1957 Supp.) §6064.1. At his 
hearing, .there was evidence that -petitioner had attended Communist Party meetings in 
1941. Also introduced were editorials which petitioner had written criticizing certain 
public officials and their policies. Konigsberg refused to answer any of the committee's 
questions relating to his political views and communist associations, other .than the direct 
question, "Do you advocate overthrow of the government of the United States or of this 
State by force or violence or other unconstitutional means?" His answer to this question 
was emphatically in the negative. The Supreme Court of California declined to review 
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that a denial predicated on unwarranted inferences and conclu-
sions, especially with regard to past affiliation with the Com-
munist Party, will be treated as offensive to due process of law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The sweeping language of 
these opinions appears to indicate that this constitutional protec-
tion to be afforded an individual will by no means be limited 
to candidates for admission to the bar. 
I 
Previous to Schware and Konigsberg, there was a general dis-
inclination on the part of the Supreme Court to consider claims 
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment in state bar admis-
sion proceedings.3 It was never disputed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects persons from any arbitrary deprivation 
of their rights by a state, whether relating to their life, liberty, 
or property.4 A considerable amount of concern, however, has 
been evidenced as to whether admission to the practice of law 
properly falls within the scope of the Amendment, i.e., is it 
"life, liberty or property"?5 That it is not "life" is elementary. 
In support of the proposition that admission is in the nature of 
a property "right," it was once felt that every citizen of the 
United States had a "right" to pursue any lawful calling or 
Konigsberg's petition, without opinion. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
speaking through Justice Black, after reviewing the evidence, which included testimonials 
from 42 persons as to Konigsberg's good character and an unblemished record as a 
teacher, health office supervisor, social worker and army officer, ruled that Konigsberg 
· had been denied due process of law. There was nothing in the record which rationally 
justified a finding that petitioner had failed to establish his good moral character or to 
show that he did not advocate overthrow of government by unconstitutional means. 
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, recommended remanding the case to obtain the California 
Supreme Court's certification as to whether it had based its decision on constitutional or 
procedural grounds. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, dissented •both on the juris-
dictional issue and on the merits. It was his opinion that, since the majority did not rule 
that the committee's questions were irrelevant or that petitioner was constitutionally 
privileged in refusing to answer them, the state was justified in refusing admission. It did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment for a bar committee to refuse certification to an 
applicant who deliberately, and without constitutional justification, obstructed a proper 
investigation into his qualifications by refusing to answer questions relevant to his fitness. 
3 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 'Wall. (83 U.S.) 130 (1872). In re Summers, 325 U.S. 
561 (1945), involved review of the question whether petitioner's freedom of religion had 
been violated by the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of admission to the bar. 
4 See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
5 O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 IA. 777 (1906). See Starrs, "Considerations on 
Determination of Good Moral Character," 18 UNIV. DETROIT L. J. 295 (1955) • 
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profession of his choice.6 It later became apparent that a state's 
grant of membership in the bar was more properly character-
ized as a "privilege burdened with conditions. "7 This charac-
terization would seem to preclude Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection to a candidate for admission to the bar, unless he can 
be said to have a guaranteed "liberty" to practice law which can-
not be arbitrarily infringed. This viewpoint has been adopted 
on occasion. 8 
An additional obstacle to the Court's review of cases in-
volving state bar admissions is the desire to allow as much 
autonomy as possible to the states in determining who is en-
titled to practice before their courts. 9 Just prior to its decision 
in the principal cases, the Court declined to consider two other 
cases presenting substantially the same set of circumstances as 
appears in Konigsberg.10 In some instances, the Supreme Court 
has acted to protect individuals from arbitrary or discriminatory 
state action that has prevented them from carrying on a partic-
ular occupation.11 These cases, however, dealt either with legis-
lative enactments or the ministerial issuance of licenses, where 
no question of judicial discretion was involved. 
Justice Black, speaking for the Court in both the Schware and 
Konigsberg cases, skillfully avoided the complexities that develop 
in attempting a proper classification of admission to the bar. 
In a rather succinct manner it was made clear that the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are to encompass every case involving a state's denial of 
6 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
7 Cardozo, J., in Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81 at 84, 116 N.E. 782 (1917). But cf. 
Henington v. State Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 393 at 398, 291 P. (2d) 1108 (1956), 
that the "right to take an examination to practice law is a qualified right ..•. " 
s See 26 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 498 (1951) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
9 See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (denial of admission to bar of conscientious 
objector for failure to take oath pledging willingness to serve in state militia upheld). 
See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (statutory suspension of physi• 
clan's medical license following conviction for failing to produce papers subpoenaed by 
congressional committee upheld). 
10 In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. (2d) 471, 121 N.E. (2d) 826 (1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 946 
(1955), reh. den. 349 U.S. 908 (1955), noted in 1955 WASH. UNlv. L. Q. 83. Cross v. State 
Bar of California, 340 U.S. 925 (1951), motion for leave to file petition for writ of man• 
damus denied 345 U.S. 990 (1953), reh. den. 346 U.S. 843 (1953). There is no official 
report of the case below, but see Farley, "Character Investigation of Applicants for 
Admission," 24 BAR EXAMINER 147 at 151 (1955). 
11 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1866); 
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1866) • 
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permission to pursue any lawful occupation.12 Justice Black thus 
apparently established that the Supreme Court will no longer 
be reluctant to intervene in such cases for the purpose of review-
ing an applicant's claim that the state's denial violated due process 
of law. 
II 
Once the jurisdictional problems were resolved, conflicting 
forces were in operation to shape the Court's decision. The 
states contended for self-determination in the selection of their 
bars, but Fourteenth Amendment guarantees were within reach 
if the refusals were found unwarranted. There was also un-
deniable pressure for a declaration in favor of the existence of 
an independent bar, free from the necessarily restrictive effects 
of forced political conformity. 
In Schware ·v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico,13 
notwithstanding other alleged indications of bad moral charac-
ter, 14 it can safely be said that petitioner's exclusion was predi-
cated almost entirely on his admitted membership in the Com-
munist Party from 1932 to 1940. No evidence, however, was pre-
sented tending to show the nature or extent of petitioner's past 
conduct while a member. The New Mexico court had focused 
attention on the party as it is viewed today, 15 and apparently 
failed to give any consideration to the party's operation during 
the period of petitioner's membership. The issue was unmis-
takable. The Court had only to determine whether Schware's 
past membership as revealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court 
was sufficient to warrant an inference of present bad moral char-
acter. In holding that it was not,16 the Court stripped New 
12 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, ~53 U.S. 232 at 238-239 (1957). 
"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation 
in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cf. Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 9 (1856). 
1s 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
14 The Court ruled that Schware's use of aliases while a dock worker and his previous 
arrests were insufficient to support a finding that he had present bad moral character. 
See 65 YALE L. J. 873 (1956) for a review of this case as it was decided by the New 
Mexico Supreme Court. 
15Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304 at 319, 291 P. (2d) 607 (1955). 
16 ". • • [P]ast membership in the Communist Party does not justify an inference 
that he presently has bad moral character." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New 
Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 at 246 (1957) • 
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Mexico's ruling of its substance and exposed its denial of ad-
mission to Schware as a denial of due process. 
In support of this, a study of the development of the Com-
munist Party in this country17 shows it to have been little more 
than a "mere pressure group and propaganda organization"1s 
working on behalf of Russia during most of the period of petition-
er's membership. The party was legally recognized, and its candi-
dates were listed on most state ballots. The inference of bad 
moral character which the state had drawn from Schware's past 
membership finds nothing to substantiate it, especially in light of 
petitioner's avowed repudiation of the party while under exam-
ination.19 Thus the conclusion that Schware had been denied 
due process of law seems clearly justifiable. A state should be 
concerned with the candidate's present character, in order to 
determine satisfactorily whether, at the time of application, he 
is morally and ethically qualified to serve the profession of his 
choice. To deny him such an opportunity solely because of his 
past political affiliation, without further evidence as to its extent, 
and after fifteen years of clear disassociation, seems patently dis-
criminatory. 
A more complex situation was before the Court in the Konigs-
berg case. Petitioner's success in thwarting the line of inquiry 
which the examining committee chose to follow20 left the com-
mittee no choice but to conclude that Konigsberg had not affirm-
atively proved his good character and fitness.21 The committee 
was forced to deny certification and framed its denial in accord-
ance with the relevant statutory provisions.22 A majority of the-
Supreme Court prevailed in making the situation before it turn 
upon the same issue as did Schware, i.e., did the evidence justify 
reasonable doubts as to petitioner's character and loyalty. In 
view of the limited amount of evidence available on which peti-
17 See Moore, "The Communist Party of the U.S.A.; An Analysis of a Social Move-
ment," 39 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 31 (1945). 
18Id. at 32. 
19Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304 at 332, 291 P. (2d) 607 (1955)., 
This is to be contrasted with Konigsberg's behavior. See note 2 supra. 
20 See note 2 supra. 
21 See excerpts from the hearing and the State's brief, Konigsberg v. State Bar of 
California, 353 U.S. 252 at 282-283, 295, 306 (1957). See also McGilvray, "California Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners: Organization, Membership and Functions," 27 CALIF. STATE: 
B. J. 26 (1952). 
22 See note 2 supra. 
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tioner could be judged,23 it was not surprising to find the Court 
holding that Konigsberg's denial for the reasons given24 was an 
arbitrary deprivation of due process of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The significance of this case lies not so much in 
what was said, but rather in what was left unsaid. 
Close scrutiny of the Konigsberg decision discloses that, where 
an applicant "in good faith" refuses to answer questions con-
sidered by the examining board to be relevant to a determination 
of moral fitness, the state can no longer deny its approval if 
whatever evidence it does have before it would not, by itself, 
justify the denial. This result was achieved through the majority's 
adroit evasion of two crucial constitutional issues: whether the 
questions asked by the examining committee were improper 
under the circumstances, and whether petitioner was constitu-
tionally entitled not to answer them-this refusal being based on 
his freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment operating through the Fourteenth.25 Nothing was said re-
garding the relevancy of the board's inquiry into petitioner's past 
or present political beliefs.26 It would seem that if the questions 
were relevant to the committee's determination of petitioner's 
moral character, a denial of admission based on lack of response 
to these questions would not appear to be arbitrary. Konigsberg's 
claim that his refusal to answer was constitutionally privileged 
was considered merely "not frivolous,"27 but no inferences of 
bad moral character were allowed to be drawn from the refusal. 
It seems altogether too plain that the effect of this case may well 
be to impede future state investigations dealing with character 
and fitness. It places in the hands of the applicant both a shield 
and a sword. He can prevent inquiries that probe into the area 
23 There was no evidence as to the extent of petitioner's membership in the Com-
munist Party, or even that he knew of the party's aims. This situation falls squarely 
within the principle of the Schware case. The Court also felt that it was not fair to 
infer bad moral character from his political writings. The real basis for the committee's 
denial seemed to be the unfavorable inferences of bad moral character which it drew 
from petitioner's refusal to answer questions probing into his political beliefs and testing 
the reliability of Jiis assertion that he did not believe in overthrow of the government 
by unconstitutional means. 
24 See note 2 supra. 
25 Cf. 'Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), comment, 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
272 (1957); and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), note, 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
291 (1957), regarding freedom of expression before legislative investigating committees. 
26 See 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 224 (1955) for a discussion of the relevancy of inquiries 
pertaining to communist affiliation in character investigations. 
27 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 at 270 (1957). 
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of political beliefs, the only requirement apparently being that 
he act "in good faith,''28 without fear of any unfavorable infer-
ences being drawn against him. And he can compel the board 
to make a determination of his fitness solely on the basis of 
whatever other evidence it is able to adduce. No longer can the 
board conclude that it has been so effectively obstructed that it 
cannot render a decision on the individual's character. Yet this 
result was reached without response to either of the critical con-
stitutional questions that must be answered to give this case 
any meaning. 
It does not seem likely that the majority, in reaching its de-
cision, intended to impair local character investigation techniques 
to the extent that might appear foreseeable. The majority would 
probably deny that the Court is venturing so far into the realm 
that is traditionally within a state's jurisdiction as to become 
in effect "a super state court of appeals."29 But in reality the 
Court appears to be doing just that, so long as it remains dis-
inclined to speak on the fundamental constitutional issues in-
volved. Perhaps Konigsberg' s justification lies in peculiar facts 
of which the Court undoubtedly took cognizance, such as in-
adequate evidence of petitioner's possible membership in the 
Communist Party, an initial negative answer without aid of 
counsel to a question whether petitioner was a philosophical 
communist, and an emphatic denial of personally advocating 
violent overthrow of the government. But until the Supreme 
Court speaks out on the questions it so adeptly avoided, and 
thereby places the case on solid constitutional ground, the full 
implications of Konigsberg will remain open to doubt. 
III 
In protecting the petitioners from arbitrary action by a state, 
the Court in both cases placed considerable emphasis on the 
absence of any evidence which would indicate the extent of 
28 " ••• [W]e find nothing in the record which indicates that his position was not 
taken in good faith. Obviously the State could not draw unfavorable inferences as to his 
truthfulness, candor or his moral character in general if his refusal to answer was based 
on a belief that the United States Constitution prohibited the type of inquiries which 
the Committee was making." Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 at 270 
(1957). 
29 Dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 
252 at 277 (1957). 
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their association with the Communist Party. Since there were 
no suggestions presented as to the nature of petitioners' past 
membership, the Court was not compelled to determine the 
kind of participation that is to be required before any inferences 
of bad moral character may be drawn.30 Some light on this 
question, however, is shed by the Court's disposition of In re 
Patterson.31 Patterson was the leader of a Communist Party cell, 
and a member of party regional boards between 1946 and 1949. 
He was a supporter of Marxist philosophy but claimed on exam-
ination that neither he nor the party advocated the overthrow of 
the United States Government by force or violence. The Oregon 
Supreme Court concluded that these statements were false, bas-
ing its opinion on popular conceptions regarding the aims of 
the Communist Party.32 It accordingly ruled that his failure to 
so It is interesting to consider the effect of the Court's holding in the principal cases 
on the scienter requirement suggested in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). That 
case held that an Oklahoma statutory loyalty oath required of state employees and inter-
preted to cover unknowing past membership in subversive organizations violated due 
process. Compare Gamer v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). 
Nevertheless, Wieman, when added to Gamer and Adler v. Board of Education of the 
City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), is generally considered as standing for the affirma-
tive proposition that knowing membership in a subversive organization may disqualify 
a person from state employment even though he did not personally believe in, act on, or 
advocate the organization's doctrine. It has been argued by McTernan, "Schware, Konigs-
berg and Independence of the Bar: The Return to Reason," 17 LAWYERS GUILD REv. 48 
(1957), that language in the Schware case at 245 and 246 indicates that the Court might 
now be disposed to require a stronger showing: "There is nothing in the record, how-
ever, which indicates that he ever engaged in any actions to overthrow the Government 
of the United States or of any State by force or violence, or that he even advocated 
such actions. Assuming that some members of the Communist Party during the period 
from 1932 to 1940 had illegal aims and engaged in illegal activities, it cannot automatically 
be inferred that all members shared their evil purposes or participated in their illegal 
conduct. As this Court declared in Wieman ... : 'Indiscriminate classification of in. 
nocent with knowing activity must .fall as an assertion of arbitrary power.'" Although 
such language is undoubtedly significant, there are a number of difficulties present in 
any attempt to relate the two cases-some of them obvious. The state has a much closer 
relationship to its employees than it does to members of its bar. The standard for 
constitutional review of specific state loyalty requirements may be somewhat different 
from that for review of what is essentially administrative action under a very general 
statutory standard. The factor of long disassociation from the organization may have 
to be given considerable weight. Moreover, the two factors measured are different: Wieman 
dealing with loyalty, and Schware with good moral character. While the suggestion of 
disloyalty perhaps inferrable from knowing membership might be sufficient to tip the 
constitutional scales when loyalty was the ultimate issue, it would not seem to be suffi-
cient when loyalty is considered merely as an evidentiary fact-only one of the many 
aspects of good moral character. When the uncertainties added by passage of time and 
change of Court personnel are considered, any comparison of the two cases must be made 
with extreme caution. 
a1 353 U.S. 952 (1957). 
S2Application of Patterson, 210 Ore. 495, 302 P. (2d) 227 (1956). 
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tell the truth in these instances was alone sufficient to justify 
a finding that Patterson did not possess the requisite "good moral 
character." He was denied admission to the Oregon Bar.83 The 
Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, vacated the Oregon 
judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of 
its decisions in Schware and Konigsberg.84 Patterson, then, pro-
vides a slight intimation as to the extent an individual may par-
ticipate in a subversive organization and yet maintain a character 
which is both "good" and "moral." But Patterson also gives 
another twist to the vise which the Supreme Court has seem-
ingly placed on the state's freedom in the selection of its bar. 
Even an individual with a record of recent Communist Party 
leadership may have to be considered by the state as morally and 
ethically qualified for the practice of law. 
IV 
In the principal cases, the Court has displayed no hesitancy in 
overruling determinations made in the exercise of judicial discre-
tion by a state court, which were believed arbitrary in nature.85 
This result was reached both when the state court's judgment was 
predicated on the nature of the evidence before it, as in Schware, 
and when it was apparently compelled by a want of evidence 
necessary for proper consideration of the issue, as in Konigsberg. 
It is this propensity to overrule, in either set of circumstances, 
that has caused Justice Harlan to warn that the Court may be 
overstepping its limits, and acting "instead as if it were a super 
state court of appeals."86 Perhaps it was a concern over this en-
croachment upon state jurisdiction that previously motivated the 
Court in declining to review cases quite comparable to Konigs-
berg. 87 
In- any review of state judicial or administrative determina-
tions, problems necessarily arise regarding the Court's readiness to 
88 Pursuant to Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §9.220. 
M In re Patterson, 353 U.S. 952 (1957). But compare Martin v. Law Society of British 
Columbia, [1950] 3 D. L. R. 173, where an admitted Communist was considered not a fit 
person to be allowed to practice law. 
85 The Supreme Court has not hesitated to overrule lower court decisions where 
admission to the federal bar is involved. See In re Levy, 348 U.S. 978 (1954), reversing 
Matter of Application of Levy, (5th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 331. See also Sacher v. Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954). 
86 Dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 
252 at 277 (1957). 
87 See note 10 supra. 
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engage in a reassessment of the facts and a reevaluation of the 
evidence. Where such cases have involved an alleged violation 
of due process of law, the Court has at times indicated that it 
will not substitute its judgment for that of the state body which 
made the determination in question.38 In other instances the 
Court has proceeded to reappraise the record thoroughly fu its 
consideration of the constitutional issues before it.39 Review 
will generally be confined, however, to an examination of the 
record in order to ascertain whether the state action was so ar-
bitrary or capricious as to offend due process. If either sub-
stantial or conflicting evidence is presented in support of the 
state's determination, this would traditionally be sufficient for 
affirmance. But from Schware and Konigsberg it appears that this 
general restraint may be somewhat relaxed. In both cases the 
Court reassessed the facts to determine whether the New Mexico. 
court and the California Committee of Bar Examiners had acted 
reasonably in finding that the petitioners had not shown good·· 
moral character. Thus an apparent willingness to reevaluate 
evidence of this type has been indicated, at least in cases involv-
ing moral character determinations.40 It now seems possible that 
any determination by a state judicial or administrative body 
which is either contrary to probative evidence or based upon a. 
lack of substantial evidence will be subject to attack as ·a viola-
tion of due process, and that upon review the Supreme Court will 
thoroughly reexamine the record presented. That this is likely 
to be true in situations involving state licenses for professions 
,, and trades seems implicit in the principal cases. Whether it_ will 
extend to other areas of state regulation is yet to be seen. Never-
theless, while it may often be difficult to distinguish between a 
non-reviewable exercise of judicial or administrative judgment 
and a reviewable finding alleged to be arbitrary as lacking substan-. 
tial evidence or as against the evidence presented, it does not seem 
likely that the Supreme Court will completely destroy this dis-
tinction. 
Jerome B. Libin 
SSE.g., People ex rel. New York &: Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345 (1917). 
39 E.g., Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). 
40 Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Schware case apparently attempted• 
to limit this potential extension of the Court's review powers. He stated that the New 
Mexico court's denial was overruled because that court, as a matter of law, had rested 
its decision on unwarranted conclusions. See McCloskey, "Useful Toil or the Paths of 
Glory? Civil Liberties in the 1956 Term of the Supreme Court," 43 VA. L. REv. 803 
at 814 (195'1). 
